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Abstract It is usually assumed that stock prices reflect a balance between large numbers of small
individual sellers and buyers. However, over the past fifty years mutual funds and other institutional
shareholders have assumed an ever increasing part of stock transactions: their assets, as a percentage
of GDP, have been multiplied by more than one hundred. The paper presents evidence which shows
that reactions to major shocks are often dominated by a small number of institutional players. Most
often the market gets a wrong perception and inadequate understanding of such events because the
relevant information (e.g. the fact that one mutual fund has sold several million shares) only becomes
available weeks or months after the event, through reports to the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC). Our observations suggest that there is a radical difference between small (< 0.5%) day-to-day
price variations which may be due to the interplay of many agents and large (> 5%) price changes
which, on the contrary, may be caused by massive sales (or purchases) by a few players. This suggests
that the mechanisms which account for large returns are markedly different from those ruling small
returns.
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1 Introduction
Very broadly speaking, there are two ways to represent stock markets and also two different method-
ologies to choose between them (Fig. 1). In the micro-player representation, the number of players
is large enough to be treated by using statistical methods. In this case, each individual player has
only a negligible impact on daily price changes. On the contrary, in the macro-player representation,
the number of players is small and each one has a substantial impact not only on daily price changes
but even on weekly or monthly price changes. In the second case a game theoretic approach would
be more sensible than a statistical approach. The main objective of this paper is to find out which
of these descriptions corresponds to the situation of markets in 2004. A first hint is provided by the
sheer weight of the macro-players. In 1900, the share of financial institutions in total corporate stock
outstanding was 6.7%, in 1974 it was 33%, in 2002 it was of the order of 50% (Kotz 1978, Statistical
Abstract of the United States 2003, p. 755).
MICRO−PLAYERS MACRO−PLAYERS
Many (>100) players Few (<5) players
Actions have a small effect Actions have a substantial effect
Broad strategic objectives in which
(<0.1%) on stock prices (>2%) on stock prices
short term portofolio optimization
is only one element
OBSERVATION MODELING
Prior to developing a model,
identify main mechanisms
through observation of
the behavior of agents and check
whether the model’s implications
Rely on a priori assumptions about
match stylized facts.critical events.
TWO CLASSES OF STOCK MARKET
TWO WAYS TO DISCRIMINATE BETWEEN THEM
of the stock
Criterion: expected value
MECHANISMS AND MODELS
Fig.1 In this paper we want to discriminate between the micro- and macro-player representations by observing
the reactions of stocks to major shocks. Trying to unravel market mechanisms prior to any attempt at construct-
ing specific mathematical models can be labeled as ex-ante analysis, as opposed to ex-post analysis which in
econometrics is the standard approach.
The purpose of this paper is to show that many (though not all) important phenomena that occur
nowadays in stock markets belong to the second class. In order to make this point, we will use an
approach which can be labelled as an ex-ante analysis. In what sense does it differ from the more
commonly used ex-post analysis? In the ex-post analysis, one begins by building a mathematical
model whose predictions are then compared to a number of stylized facts. In econometrics, this
is the approach which is used almost exclusively. In the ex-ante analysis one tries to design an
“experiment” whose results give us a better insight into the mechanisms which are at work. When
using the term “experiment” I do not mean a laboratory experiment with paid human subjects but
rather a problem-oriented observation (also referred to as a quasi-experiment) selected and designed
in order to shed new light on a specific phenomenon. In this paper I will use the ex-ante analysis in
order to decide which of the micro- or macro-representation is more acceptable. More specifically, I
will emphasize the importance of strategic investments as opposed to transactions based on expected
value. In addition, by monitoring as closely as possible the behavior of shareholders in the weeks and
days preceding a bankruptcy, I will analyze how investors react to the risk of bankruptcy. Although
the paper relies on a number of case studies, I believe that the behaviors which will be identified have
a fairly broad validity. To begin with, I consider the case of Kmart, the American retail store company.
2 Kmart: background information
As several of the cases to be considered below concern Kmart, it is in order to give some background
information for this company. It was founded in 1899 by Sebastian Kresge and was called the Kresge
company until 1977 when its name was changed to Kmart. As shown by Fig. 2a it has been a highly
successful discount retailer for many decades, but fell into trouble in the 1980s 1 . Eventually it had
to ask for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in January 2002. The losing battle that Kmart fought
against Wal-Mart can be summarized by the following figures.
Kmart Wal-Mart
Revenue 1990 [billion dollars] 32 32
Revenue 1994 [billion dollars] 36 83
In 1993, Kmart had to close 5% of its stores and in 1994 it experienced a loss of one billion dollars.
These poor performances led to increased indebtedness and in 1996, the rating of its debt was lowered
below investment grade. For a company of the size of Kmart to be rated at junk level is something
which is not common. In subsequent years, Kmart continued to lose market shares to Wal-Mart.
The fall of its share price shown in Fig. 2a is consistent with this loss of momentum. However, the
trajectory of the stock price shown in Fig. 2b,c is fairly puzzling and raises the following questions:
• Why did it increase by almost 100% between September 2000 and August 2001?
• Why did it abruptly drop in January 2002 leading the company into bankruptcy?
1Symbolizing this trend was the fact that back in 1988, in the Oscar-winning film “Rainman”, the character played by
Dustin Hoffman repeatedly refers to Kmart by saying “Kmart sucks” meaning that the stores were shabby and displayed
low quality items.
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Fig.2a Ratio of Kmart stock price to the Standard and Poor’s 500 index (1910-1999) In the 1950s
In the late 1980s after becoming confronted to Wal-Mart’s competition Kmart entered a downward spiral that
lasted over 20 years and eventually lead to its bankruptcy in January 2002. After the company emerged from
bankruptcy in May 2003, its shareprice increased more than 5 times within 18 months. The reference to the
film “Rainman” is explained in the text. Source: Common stock (1992), Kmart Fact Book (1999).
In the expected value framework one would wish to know which innovations in Kmart’s growth
perspectives justified these changes. In fact, there were none. Both the increase and the sharp fall
were due to causes which had very little to do with Kmart’s growth perspectives. The 100% rise
resulted from the strategic move of a single investor, Ronald Burkle, a billionaire and head of an
investment firm.
3 Burkle’s deal with Kmart
Between October 2000 and October 2001, Burkle bought 7.2% of Kmart’s outstanding shares (Fig.
2b). We know this because an investor who wishes to buy more than 5% of the shares has to notify the
Securities and Exchange Commission in advance which he did on October 13, 2000. In the present
case we are fortunate to know his global strategy, something which is rarely the case. The purchase
of Kmart shares was in fact part of a broader deal. Before 2001, Kmart had two grocery suppliers:
Supervalue (for $ 2.3 billions) and Fleming (for $ 1.3 billion). In February 2001, that is to say 5
months after Burkle began his massive purchases, it became known that Kmart had chosen Fleming
as exclusive supplier for the next 10 years, a deal whose value was estimated at $45 billions. As it
happens, Burkle had a stake of almost 10% in Fleming. This makes the deal fairly clear. Burkle
invests about $ 0.1 billion in Kmart shares and in return he gets an exclusivity contract that is worth
450 times more (CNN, February 7, 2001)
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Fig.2b Kmart share price (July 2000 - December 2001). The insert shows how the price increase
that took place between June 2000 and August 2001 (as delimited by the circle) fits into the broader picture;
this increase was mainly due to the fact that a consortium led by billionaire Ronald Burkle purchased 7.2%
of Kmart’s outstanding shares. Once Burkle’s share purchases stopped the price resumed its downward trend.
Source: CNN Money (January 22, 2002).
Naturally, Kmart denied that there was any link between the two transactions. However, one should
keep in mind that in 1999 Kmart tried to initiate a buyback program of its own shares for a total
amount of $ 1 billion; assuming a price range from $ 5 to $ 10 per share, this represented between
20% and 40% of its outstanding shares. Unable to complete this program by itself because of its
indebtedness, Kmart certainly relied on the deal with Burkle for implementing its objective, albeit on
a smaller scale than planned initially.
To sum up, the 100% price increase in Fig.2b had much to do with Burkle and Fleming, but very little
with Kmart itself. We now turn to the events which occurred in the weeks before Kmart’s bankruptcy.
4 The withdrawal of Fidelity from Kmart
In a CNN financial report of February 15, 2002 one reads:
Jim Lowell, editor of the newsletter “Fidelity Investor” said Fidelity recently slashed its
holding in Kmart. Kmart had represented almost 10% of assets at Fidelity parent com-
pany Fidelity Management and Research Corporation (FMR) until recently, before the
company slashed its position to 1.3%.
We posit that Fidelity’s move (which was certainly imitated by other institutional holders even though
we don’t have explicit statements) accounts for much of Kmart’s stock price collapse in January 2002
(Fig. 2c). Note that as holdings are reported only every three months we do not know when exactly
the sales occurred. As a result the term “recently” used in the above excerpt of the CNN report is
fairly elastic: it refers to a date comprised between November 15, 2001 and January 22, 2002.
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Fig.2c Kmart share price in January 2002. When Fidelity began to sell its shares, it became obvious
that Kmart no longer had the support of its major institutional shareholders. Source: New York Times (January
2002).
FMR is the world’s largest investment fund with assets estimated in 2003 at about 1 trillion dollars.
The parent company has several subsidiaries such as Fidelity Magellan, Fidelity Growth Company,
Fidelity Leveraged Company which manage its funds. Unfortunately, in contrast to the previous case,
we do not know precisely the reason of Fidelity’s move. Of course, if Kmart had been unable to
avoid bankruptcy that would have been a sufficient motive for (as we explain below) share holders
usually lose next to 100% of their assets in a bankruptcy. However, my reading is that Kmart was not
driven into bankruptcy by its debt but rather by the withdrawal of its major share holders. That feeling
relies on the fact that Kmart’s assets in terms of real estate (land and stores) was estimated at $ 15
billions in a report published by the Deutsche Bank in July 20042; no doubt that, in early 2002 prior
to the bankruptcy, the value of this asset was substantially larger. As Kmart’s debt never exceeded $
4 billions, it was not in an Enron-like situation where the debt was actually larger than the real worth
of the assets.
Naturally, if major investors withdraw their support, if the company’s debt is downgraded by rating
agencies (which indeed happened on January 17, 2002), then it cannot get new short-term loans and
bankruptcy becomes unavoidable. At this point there is a question for which we do not yet have
a satisfactory answer. We know that Fidelity (along with other mutual funds) sold its shares, but
2In late July 2004 Kmart actually sold 78 of its 2000 stores for about $ 1 billion.
we do not know who bought them. In a climate where there are persistent rumors about a possible
bankruptcy there must have been very little incentive for any investor to buy these shares even at
a fraction of their initial price. Of course, on the NYSE it is the duty of market makers to ensure
market fluidity, but it is difficult to understand how can they fulfill this task when there are no buyers
whatsoever.
Before we turn to the next episode we need to better understand what happens once a corporation has
filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, especially with respect to its shares and shareholders.
5 Impact of bankruptcy on stocks
After the bankruptcy, some of the major debt holders usually provide short-term cash to the bankrupt
company; in return, they get highest priority on the list of the creditors. On the contrary, common
share holders are listed at the bottom. However, it should be noted that a company is not automatically
delisted from the exchange after asking for bankruptcy protection. The only immediate change is the
fact that the ticker symbol becomes followed by the letter Q. Thus Kmart’s ticker symbol was changed
from KM to KMQ. Incidentally, one week after the bankruptcy the price stood at $ 1.4, more than
double the $ 0.66 the stock was worth the day the bankruptcy was declared; but this improvement
did not last very long. On the New York Stock Exchange the criteria for continued listing include a
requirement that a company’s stock trade at a minimum average price of 1 dollar over a 30-day period.
In the case of Kmart, the share traded under the $ 1 threshold from July to December 2002 and, as
a result, it was delisted from the NYSE in December. But even after that, the stock continued to be
traded in Pink Streets, an over the counter exchange. Yet, when Kmart emerged from bankruptcy
on May 6, 2003, it canceled its old stock and issued new shares. At this point the old share holders
lost all their remaining assets. Half of the stock issued on May 6, went to creditor Edward Lampert.
The rest of the shares went to other creditors. With 49% of the shares, Lampert got complete control
over Kmart. He and some of his associates, including William Crowley, soon after became part of
the board of directors comprising nine people (Detroit Free Press, May 6, 2003). Thus began a new
phase of Kmart’s history to which we turn now.
6 Lampert’s era
Although still a fairly young man (he is born in 1963) Edward Lampert was in 2003 one of the stars
of the hedge fund industry; he was listed in fourth position among the top 10 fund managers with an
annual pay of $ 420 million (Georges Soros came first on this list with $ 750 million). Fig. 2d shows
a strong and steady price increase after Kmart emerged from bankruptcy.
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Fig.2d Kmart share price (May 2003 - September 2004) After Kmart emerged from bankruptcy, 49%
of its shares were in the hands of ESL Investments, one of its creditors. SEC reports show that over 2003-2004
ESL bought a substantial slice of the remaining float. Source: http://finance.yahoo.com, table 1.
Does this mean that Kmart had solved its problems and was up for a new start? Certainly not. Kmart’s
market share continued to shrink and in fact at a faster rate than before the bankruptcy. In 2003,
comparable-store sales dropped by 30% and, even more worrying, the rate accelerated from 3.2%
in the first quarter to 13% in the last quarter. Yet, over that time interval the share price more than
doubled. How can one explain that?
The answer is very simple. There was a permanent flow of purchases by Lampert’s hedge fund (see
table 1). It should be noted that all these transactions were performed in the Non-Open market. In this
market, the price is settled by a prior agreement between buyers and sellers. As all the shares were
in the hands of various institutions, it is very likely that strategic considerations played a big role in
these transactions. The financial situation of Kmart did indeed improve but only because it sold some
of this stores to Sears, Roebuck and Co. and to Home Depot3.
7 Hints about the future of Kmart
As the price rise documented in Fig. 2d was largely disconnected from underlying fundamentals, it
can hardly be expected that it will continue for long. In fact, it will continue until Lampert decides that
his strategy no longer requires the price to rise. Several analysts expect that Lampert will continue to
sell the most valuable assets of Kmart before eventually taking it completely out of the retail business.
Whether that can be done in the present framework or requires the liquidation of the company is a
matter of debate. As one analyst lucidly commented, now that Kmart is under the control of ESL,
3Incidentally, it can be noted that Lampert also owned 28% of Sears, Roebuck and Co.
Table 1 Purchases of Kmart shares by Lampert’s hedge fund in 2003-2004
Year Date Number of shares
[million shares]
1 2003 June 30 7.0
2 2003 Oct. 23 1.7
3 2003 Nov. 03 0.45
4 2003 Feb. 12 0.024
5 2004 Apr. 27 0.89
6 2004 Jul. 1 7.2
7 2004 Jul. 16 2.1
8 2004 Aug. 18 0.053
Total 19.4
% of shares 23%
% of float 46%
Notes: As of August 24, 2004, Lampert’s hedge fund, ESL Investments, owned directly of indirectly, 82% of
Kmart shares, a stake consisting of its initial stake of 49% as a creditor of Kmart plus the above 23% which it
purchased over 2003 and 2004. All the acquisitions listed in the table were made in the Non-Open-Market.
Source: Insider and Form 144 Filings - ESL Investments - http://biz.yahoo.com/t/97/342.html
any analysis based on Kmart’s fundamentals becomes irrelevant because what is good for Kmart is
not necessarily good for ESL and vice versa. As of September 4, 2004 about 25% of the shares were
sold short4, a transaction which generates a profit only if the price falls.
Remark With over 80% of the shares in the hands of ESL Investments one would expect the trading
volume for Kmart’s shares to be markedly lower than for other corporations whose ownership is less
concentrated. Yet, one observes exactly the opposite. Between July and September 2004, an average
2.7 million shares were traded daily which represents 3% of the shares outstanding; that figure is
about 150 times higher than for General Electric and 11 times higher than for IBM. Why is Kmart
trading volume one or two orders of magnitude higher than such widely traded stocks as GE or IBM?
This remains an open question.
8 Summary of Kmart’s case
Let us summarize what we learned from this case-study.
1) Until 1999-2000 there was a connection between Kmart’s share price and its achievements as
a discount retailer.
2) After October 2000, there is a one-year episode marked by a strong price rise due to a deal
with a supplier which bears no relationship whatsoever with Kmart’s performances.
4This percentage is well above standard short percentages: for instance it was equal to 0.30% for General Electric and
0.82% for IBM
3) The bankruptcy occurred when one of the major share holders withdrew its support. Although
it is difficult to distinguish with certainty between cause and consequence, the question must be
examined in the light of what happened subsequently, namely the fact that the corporation fell under
the control of Lampert’s hedge fund.
4) The 700% price increase between May 2003 and September 2004 was completely at variance
with the evolution of Kmart’s growth fundamentals.
Kmart was selected because it went through a bankruptcy. The idea was that a major shock would
reveal features about the behavior of share holders which are relatively obscured and hidden in more
ordinary conditions. However, similar mechanisms are at work also in cases characterized by big
shocks even in the absence of a bankruptcy. This is illustrated by the following example.
9 Converium
Converium (NYSE: CHR) is a Swiss reinsurer which ranks among the top 10 reinsurers and employs
approximatively 850 people in 23 countries around the world. Why did I select Converium among
many other possible cases? My attention was attracted to it because it experienced a sharp price fall in
July 2004. Subsequently I discovered that one of our colleagues, econophysicist Michel Dacorogna,
is a senior member of its Risk Modeling team; naturally, this further increased my interest in the
company. The graph (Fig. 3) of its share price is particularly striking because it has been very stable
during two years before dropping sharply by 50% on July 21, 2004. After this date it continued to fall
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Fig.3 Converium share price (September 2003 - September 2004. Converium, a Swiss reinsurer
began to be listed on the New York Stock Exchange in January 2002. From that date to mid-July 2004 its price
remained within a fairly narrow margin of 25 ± 5 dollars. Then, on July 21, it suddenly dropped 50% after the
company’s announcement that it will have to increase its reserves. Source: http:// finance.yahoo.com.
albeit more slowly. As of September 23, 2004 its share price was as low as $ 7.80 which means that
it had been divided by more than 4 with respect to the price level of January 2004. The comments
offered by analysts in the wake of the fall of July 21 were not very convincing. They attributed the
fall to a net loss amounting to 22% of its capitalization and to the fact that it had to strengthen its
reserves by a similar amount. Although fairly serious, such a problem did not imperil the existence
of the company especially because the loss was limited to its activity in the United States5. A more
tangible explanation came two weeks later, on August 3 2004, in the form of the following statement
made by the company:
Converium Holding hereby informs that Fidelity International (based in Hamilton, Bermuda)
has reduced its holding in Converium from 9.87% to 3.81%.
As is common in such announcements, it did not say when exactly Fidelity had sold its shares6 . As
in the case of Kmart in January 2002, a flow of bad news followed. For instance, on September 1,
Standard and Poor’s cut the rating of Converium’s North America to BBB, just one notch above junk
status. The rating of Converium AG, the Swiss unit was also lowered. In this respect, it should be
noted that in principle the role of rating agencies is to foresee possible financial problems ahead of
the “market”, whereas in this case as well as in many others (e.g. Enron, Kmart, WorlCom) their
reactions followed the announcement made by the company, in the present case by more than one
month.
At first sight, one may be tempted to think that these reactions were simply the normal consequence
of a change in the growth fundamentals of the company. However, the fact that on August 10, Capital
Group, another mutual fund, increased its stake in Converium from 4.05% to 5.34% shows that the
fundamentals were not read in the same way by all the players. In fact, it seems it was rather a
showdown between two groups of players.
On September 15, 2004 came the first rumors that Converium could become the target of a possible
takeover, an operation that its low stock price facilitated. The most widely named potential buyers
were Munich Re and Berkshire Hathaway, Warren Buffet’s company. On September 17, Converium
made known that its discussions to enter into a possible partnership with these two companies were
nearing a successful conclusion.
5As one of the main activities of Converium was the reassurance of airspace industries, it is possible that the loss was
a consequence of 9/11
6The reaction of the market to the information revealed on July 21 was particularly swift, but this was largely due to
the fact that the “market” was a small group of fund managers, among whom the manager of Fidelity International had a
leading role.
10 Generalizations
To what extent is it possible to generalize the results of these case-studies? One can give the following
answers.
• The Kmart episode was not an isolated example. As a matter of fact, the strategy Lampert
used at Kmart had been used previously in others of its acquisitions such as Autonation (NYSE:AN),
America’s largest retailer of new and used vehicles, Autozone (NYSE: AZO), Deluxe (NYSE: DLX)
and finally Sears, Roebuck and Co (NYSE: S).
• The fact that an investment fund reduces its stake in a company to a considerable extent in a
short time interval is relatively common. Table 2 gives a number of illustrations over 2002-2004 for
FMR which naturally is only one of the giant mutual funds (albeit the largest). Usually the growth
fundamentals of a company do not change sharply in a few months which means that such massive
sales (or purchases) pursued broader strategic objectives.
Table 2 Effect on share prices of a change in holdings by Fidelity Management and Research (FMR)
Date Company Ticker Initial Subsequent Price
symbol stake stake variation
[%] [%] [%]
1 2002 Dec. Teradyne NYSE:TER 15 8.24 −61
2 2003 Dec. Delta Airlines NYSE:DAL 7.3 0.5 −72
3 2003 Oct. Forrester Research NASDAQ:NM 9.4 2.8 −30
4 2004 Feb. Boeing NYSE:BA 2.2 3.6 17
Notes: FMR is the world’s largest investment fund with about one trillion dollar under management (which
represents 10% of the US GDP). The price variation refers to the quarter during which the sales or purchases
were made (we do not know the exact dates of the transactions). Earlier FMR moves include the reduction of
its stake in (i) United Airlines from 6% to 2% (June 1994), (ii) Apple Computer from 11% to 2.5% (August
1995), (iii) Technology stocks (end of 1995), (iv) US Airways from 11.3% to 5.8% (May 1996), (v) Digital
Equipment Corporation from 13.7% to 7% (June 1996), (vi) Chrysler Corporation from 12.2% to 7.8% (June
1996) Besides FMR there are several other mutual funds giants (e.g. Vanguard Group, Capital Research and
Management, State Street) whose moves have also a substantial impact on stock prices.
Sources: Boston Business Journal (Dec. 10 2002, Oct. 10 2003); Atlanta Business Chronicle (Dec. 19 2003);
The News Tribune of Tacoma, Washington (Feb. 18 2004), New York Times (June 11 1994, January 12 1996,
Aug. 15 1996); Wall Street Journal (Oct. 12 1995); USA Today (May 9 1996); Boston Herald (July 11 1996).
11 Conclusion
The main message of this paper is the observation that many of the major shocks to which companies
are confronted are due to the moves of a small number of investment funds. In the case of Kmart we
have seen that single investors played a central role in each of the three successive episodes which
sealed the fate of the corporation between 2000 and 2004: first it was Burkle, then FMR and finally
Lampert.
The key role played by major investment funds can be further illustrated by comparing the major
holders of three airline companies, namely American Airlines, Delta Airlines, and US Airways. Table
3 summarizes the information as of September 10, 2004.
Table 3 Major holders in three airlines
Holder Stake in Stake in Stake in
American Air. Delta Air. US Air.
[%] [%] [%]
A Insiders and rule 144 holders < 1 < 1
Retirement System of Alabama 79
B Institutions
PAR Capital Management 9.6
Prime Cap Management 8.8 10
Lord Abbet 5.4 4.8
Brandes Investment Partners 3.3 9.4
Wellington Management 4.9
Stavo Asset Management 4.5
Barclays Bank 4.0
Capital Guardian Trust 9.1
Capital Research and Management 5.5
UBS Global Asset 3.9
State Street 3.2
Baupost Group 4.3
Farallon Capital Management 1.6
C Funds < 0.1
Vanguard/Primecap 5.8 6.5
Lord Abbett Fund 2.2 2.7
Vanguard Horizon 1.9 2.3
Fidelity Growth 9.9
Vanguard Windsor Fund 2.0
Percentage held by institutional owners 97 97 88
Notes: Although it may not be of great relevance, especially in major shocks, we retained the standard distinc-
tion between insiders and rule 144 holders (A), institutions (B), and funds (C). Most of the institutions which
have substantial stakes in both American and Delta also hold shares of other airlines such as Continental, North-
West or SouthWest. The table documents the sharp difference between the ownership structure of American
and Delta on the one hand and US Air on the other hand. The giant mutual funds have no longer any substantial
stake in US Air.
Source: http://finance.yahoo.com/
Three significant observations can be made.
1) Several institutional holders have a stake in both American and Delta. Examination of other
airlines (e.g. Continental, NorthWest, Southwest) shows that these players also hold substantial stakes
in those other airlines.
2) There is a fundamental difference between the major holders of American and Delta on the one
hand and those of US Airways on the other. In the latter we do not find any major investment funds
with a substantial (say over 1%) stake. Most of the shares are in the hands of the Alabama Retirement
Fund which, through its links with Social Security, is probably partly funded by federal money. This
striking difference is certainly to be attributed to the fact that US Airways went through bankruptcy
in August 2002. As seen previously, stocks are likely to lose all their worth in a bankruptcy process.
For major holders the main problem therefore is to be able to sell before the price has collapsed.
Naturally, such tactics are double edged because the withdrawal of a major holder may drive down
the market price to a point which makes bankruptcy ineluctable.
3) On financial websites such as Yahoo, investment companies are listed apart from the funds
itself. One may wonder if such a distinction is really relevant. Consider for instance the Vanguard
Group which offers more than 100 funds. It can be admitted that in ordinary day-to-day operations,
each fund has some autonomy. However, in critical junctures (such as a bankruptcy risk) all funds
tend to follow the same tactic as can be seen from the fact that all Vanguard funds left US Airways as
it was stumbling toward its first bankruptcy7.
Fig. 4 shows that, since 1945, mutual funds experienced an exponential growth which was shortly
interrupted only by the bear market of 1968-1978. As for any exponential growth, the beginnings were
inconspicuous. It is only in recent years that mutual funds were able to get a firm grip on American
stock markets. If this evolution continues the conception based on micro-players will become less
and less relevant.
In a previous paper (Roehner 2005) it was shown that, through buyback programs, corporations can
influence the price level of their own stock. To make that point we did not have to resort to microe-
conomic analysis as we did in the present paper; why did the present study require behavior analysis
at the level of individual players? The answer is obvious. We wanted to scrutinize the economic
rationale of the moves of major players and in order to do that one has to understand and weigh their
actions in detail. Such an approach is complimentary to the comprehensive macrodynamic analysis
of market structure carried out by other researchers such as for instance Elroy Dimson et al. (2002),
Rosario Mantegna et al. (2000) or Didier Sornette (2003). Finally, there is an important question
which we did not consider and which should be addressed in a subsequent study. What is the kind
of interaction between macro-players. Is it a competitive or cooperative linkage, or perhaps both
depending on circumstances?
7Furthermore different investment companies may have overlapping interest; as an example one can mention that
Wellington Management, one of the oldest American money management firm, manages 16 of the funds offered by
Vanguard.
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Fig.4 Growth of American mutual funds compared to the growth of the US gross domestic
product (1945-2000). Between 1947 and 2000 the assets of mutual funds as a proportion of GDP have been
multiplied by a factor of the order of 100. We had to rely on two different series because the pre-1970 data
available in the Historical Statistics of the United States refer to total assets (i.e. stocks plus bonds), whereas
the Statistical Abstract more specifically gives equity assets. Both trajectories are exponential. Naturally,
mutual funds represent only one class (albeit the most important) of institutional share holders besides insurance
companies, banks, state retirement funds, hedge funds, etc. Source: Historical Statistics of the US (1975),
Statistical Abstract of the US (various years).
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A Appendix A: Sources and secretiveness
In many respects this study would not have been possible without the Internet. In pre-Internet times,
one would have had to rely on archives of newspapers and economic magazines. Because of the im-
possibility of performing broad keyword searches, many relevant papers would not have been identi-
fied. In addition, locating and accessing the relevant archives in various research libraries would have
made the whole process utterly time-consuming. Apart from the Internet we also used Lexis-Nexis,
a newspaper data base which is available to subscribers (many research libraries offer this service).
However, even with these tools, it was not always possible to get all the information that would have
been needed. There were two main obstacles. (i) Some information is not made public. For instance,
hedge funds are not required to report their positions, trading activity and creditworthiness. By 2000,
there were about 5,800 hedge funds, most of them registered off-shore to avoid taxation, totaling
$˜300 billion in capital (Derivatives Study Center, http://www.financialpolicy.org). As an illustration
of this secretiveness, one can mention the episode of the speculation against the British pound in 1992
which led to its withdrawal from the European Monetary System. This destabilization is commonly
attributed to Georges Soros’ hedge fund, but due to the lack of any official statement it is still impos-
sible to confirm or to disprove this assertion.
ii) A second problem concerns the fact that even when it is made public the relevant information
often comes too late. The major source of information about ownership are the reports required by
the Securities and Exchange Commission in which companies document their most recent moves.
Unfortunately, these reports are published only every quarter (in some cases every semester) which
means that the information will come weeks after the move has affected price levels. For instance, in
the case of Kmart we learned about the the withdrawal of Fidelity Management by a report that came
on February 2, 2002 that is to say almost one month after the price collapse began and two weeks
after Kmart filed for bankruptcy protection.
There is a last point which has to be mentioned. So far we did not consider the link between mutual
funds and their subscribers. One could argue that subscribers can influence the behavior of fund
managers. This would be true if they could get informed in time. As we have seen, this is not the
case: not only do they learn about major moves well after the event, but usually they are also unable
to know how fund managers who sit as directors on corporate boards voted in crucial occasions 8 .
8In January 2003, in spite of vocal opposition led by Fidelity Investments and Vanguard, the Securities and Exchange
Commission, voted in favor of disclosure of proxy votes by mutual funds and established August 31, 2004 as the deadline
for disclosure of votes cast during the year ending June 30, 2004 (see “Behind the curtain” by the AFL-CIO Office of
investement, September 2004). We observe once again that this decision makes information available to shareholders only
months after the events took place.
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